The Tether
A thread drawn taut between two distant thresholds.
Tether is the private-reachability Aspect. WireGuard is its accepted transport.
Its native rootless-wireguard-stream-v1 profile offers one network to admitted peers and receives
independent imported attachments in isolated rootless Pods outside Core.
State of Work records maturity, source and test evidence,
and the live qualification still required. Select tether-container-v1 during original
initialization for LychD-managed roads. Native operations preserve that initialization intent
while registering imported attachments and admitting peers separately.
Tether's closed compiler publishes the offered WireGuard UDP endpoint; generic Extension port declarations remain loopback-only. Owner web access uses the optional restricted SSH binding below and preserves Core's loopback browser policy. The infrastructure-owned single-owner access candidate is a separate legacy path, not the preferred path for native Tether or evidence of shared remote Altar support.
Managed path and peer custody
ADR 39 permits a managed Tether to manifest as a rootless service with narrow network capability and explicit UDP publication. Interface, listen port, address space, DNS behavior, routes, and peer limits remain Rune-owned intent.
The Tether service stays outside the shared application Pod and receives no broad mounts,
application secrets, database credentials, or host-mutation authority. CAP_NET_ADMIN inside that
Pod is not an acceptable shortcut.
An optional Gateway Host composes Tether only for a placement that needs a private routed road. Remote may bind one exact peer and route from the off-site Veil to one Core backend. Home does not require Tether when an exact local segment already supplies reachability. In neither placement does a tunnel grant authority or a default route into the home network.
Keep the public account of a peer in the Codex: stable identity, public key, allowed addresses and routes, endpoint and keepalive policy, enabled or revoked state, and creation or rotation metadata. Keep private and preshared keys with the secret owner, outside ordinary documentation, logs, QR history, and public peer records.
The lychd tether command group delegates preparation, key import, registration, admission,
enrollment, binding, activation, inspection and revocation to the native lifecycle service.
Client configuration and QR export are not part of that operation set.
One offered network, many received accesses
ADR 39 separates the network a Lich offers from the independent VPN attachments it receives. The example below describes the native compiler's isolated attachment selection; application enrollment and live deployment qualification remain separate boundaries.
Suppose Lich A offers A-home to an admitted Lich D. A also receives B-private from Lich B and
C-private from Lich C, whose application endpoints are private. B and C independently choose
the same inner service address:
| Intended service | Selected attachment | Inner destination | Routing context |
|---|---|---|---|
| B's Intercom | B-private |
10.77.0.2:443 |
isolated B context |
| C's Intercom | C-private |
10.77.0.2:443 |
isolated C context |
A selects (B, B-private, Intercom) or (C, C-private, Intercom), together with the current
attachment generation and admitted service policy. The equal addresses are valid because the
routing contexts are separate. The remote WireGuard UDP contact has its own coordinates; the
table names the application service inside each tunnel. TLS and Intercom still verify the
selected remote application identity.
If B's road fails or is revoked, A's connection to B fails. It is never sent to C or to a public replacement. C's independent attachment remains unchanged. Pools and any profile-permitted DNS or reconnect behavior retain the same selected road; the first A2A profile's stricter rules still apply. A tunnel handshake alone establishes no authenticated Intercom readiness.
D's admission to A-home gives D no route into B-private or C-private. Receiving B's or C's
VPN configuration neither enrolls them into A-home nor grants access to A's other services.
Application-mediated work remains subject to its own caller, destination, disclosure, and effect
authorization; turning A into a transit router is a separate decision.
For each received access, locally admit the exact remote service, tunnel key references, route scope, and required DNS behavior. Imported configurations do not authorize executable hooks, default routes, or changes to host DNS. Keep each network's credentials and revocation intent separate. A peer with an admitted public endpoint needs no VPN attachment; a private-only peer still needs a reachable tunnel endpoint or a separately accepted relay/traversal arrangement.
Separate routing contexts can be embodied by dedicated rootless services; a container is not required for every peer. Native namespace services remain a technical alternative requiring their own accepted privilege and lifecycle contract. Tether stays outside the application Pod and Vessel. Neither approach has a measured universal per-attachment RAM or throughput cost; capacity qualification must include the selected forwarding helpers and simultaneous workload.
Reach attachment
The Reach deployment matrix gives Tether one exact
consumer: reach.edge-home.public@1.
Home-only and standalone outbound VPS use none. The split profile admits one named VPS peer, one
exact address and route, explicit expiry and revocation generation, and one Tether-only private
Veil backend for event admission, delivery claim, settlement, and health. It never uses
0.0.0.0/0, exposes the home Phylactery, Reach core, Altar, model API, Podman socket, Reactor, or
forwards arbitrary VPS traffic through the sovereign host.
Tether holds only tunnel material. Root/VPS compromise still requires revoking that peer, separately rotating every resident application and operator credential, reconciling uncertain effects, and rebuilding the host; tunnel revocation alone is not containment.
Tunnel identity and exact routes
WireGuard proves possession of a tunnel key and encrypts packets. Human or process identity, object or effect authorization, consent, and device trust remain outside that proof. The host firewall selects each reachable listener; Veil may constrain route or transport policy, while Ward and the Vessel authenticate and authorize.
For Intercom, the conservative first designed road is a Veil-compiled HTTP route exposed only through Tether. Tether supplies private reachability; Veil canonicalizes ingress; Ward admits the peer; Intercom verifies and replay-fences the A2A envelope. None may impersonate the next layer or turn an advertised Spell or Scroll into authority.
A tunnel address, interface, peer key, or forwarded metadata contributes at most credential
evidence. It cannot mint magus:*, widen a Sigil, or create an administrator. Bootstrap
magus:* stays same-host only. Routes default to exact destinations; PostgreSQL, model APIs,
container and Host lifecycle control, Oculus, audio, and
Intercom remain closed unless their own policies admit them.
Revocation, rotation, and recovery
Before changing the service, binding validates peer-address overlap and route conflicts within each routing domain, key references, port collisions, and the generated contribution. Revocation then removes a peer from the live interface and persists the revised intent. Rotation may overlap old and new credentials only with explicit operator authorization.
Version the public peer and routing intent so restore or reconciliation cannot revive stale or revoked access. Keep failures visible; privileged traffic must never escape through a public fallback.
Direct WireGuard avoids a mandatory hosted control plane, but CGNAT, blocked UDP, changing endpoints, roaming, endpoint metadata, and traffic analysis remain. Reachability may require fixed addressing, DNS, or a separately accepted rendezvous or relay. ADR 39 owns transport law; Security and the Ward own the trust boundary.
Native profile configuration contract
The native rootless-wireguard-stream-v1 contract separates static topology from current
admission. Its Rune and public values describe at
most one offered network and many independent imported attachments. The
pure compiler receives a current host-owned
admission snapshot explicitly; loading an imported document does not enable it.
Each imported attachment names its remote Lich, local tunnel-key reference, remote public key, numeric UDP endpoint, numeric inner services, TLS hostnames and allowed callers. The first profile uses admitted static resolution only. The same private service address in two attachments is valid because each has a separate private Pod, socket directory and route generation. Core selects the complete route and verifies the remote application independently.
Private keys never belong in Rune documents or public role JSON. Preparation must establish purpose-specific immutable secrets before binding. Runtime projections carry secret references, not secret values. Binding still reconciles the complete installation; it does not replace Scribe with a per-route file writer. Repeating unchanged intent preserves keys and route generations.
Compiled Tether role units use Restart=no: a fenced or failed runtime must not create another
manager invocation outside native launch custody. Native tether activate and the boot-time
tether resume helper own eligible replacement launches; pending revocation must finish first.
The optional same-owner-ssh-loopback-v1 binding gives a specific offered peer a separate SSH
public-key admission and restricted SSH adapter. It permits only a local forward to the current
owner web loopback port. Open the browser at the same admitted loopback address and port used by
local owner access; the tunnel preserves the browser's Host, Origin and Basic authentication.
There is no WireGuard-exposed Altar HTTP listener. General application peers do not acquire this
owner binding implicitly.
Live acceptance must cover two overlapping imported networks, two offered peers, authenticated Core-selected service access, real owner browser access where selected, failed routes without fallback, and revocation during active streams. Repeat initialization, preparation, binding and activation; then verify restart and reinstall without editing the original creation receipt. Current delivery and qualified platform combinations remain owned by State of Work.
Registering roads after initialization
The original Tether initialization intent remains immutable. Native attachment registration stores
one validated public ImportedAttachment in Tether-owned runtime data; it does not edit the Rune
file or installation receipt. Registration stages the road only. Import its own local key material,
admit generation 1, bind the complete fileset and activate separately. Repeating the same
registration is a no-op. The installation may begin with only an offered network and acquire
independent received attachments later without reinstalling Core.
Before changing an existing attachment, revoke its exact current generation and finish physical closure and binding reconciliation. Registration preserves the disabled generation tombstone; subsequent admission requires the next generation. Retired key references retain their original road and purpose ownership. Registering a road cannot change the transport image, offered network, Core settings or application authentication. Repeating preparation with the original intent does not remove roads registered later. The Core socket-parent mount stays fixed across these changes.
New offered peers can be enrolled while the network remains active when the namespace policy is unchanged and every required key is ready. A second owner-access peer can therefore join without interrupting the existing owner's SSH adapter. Introducing the first owner-access bridge, changing Pod policy, or rotating an existing peer requires an explicit cold change. Missing preshared keys must be staged through the inactive path before admission.
Revoking the last owner retains the declared one-port bridge capacity in the offered Pod while removing that peer's WireGuard admission, ingress and SSH adapter. Disabled owner tombstones keep this Pod policy stable; they grant no live access. An installation that has never declared an owner binding still needs the cold path to introduce its first bridge.
After a failed start, revocation also closes a Pod created before its receipt was saved when the retained launch proves its exact owned invocation. If that proof is unavailable, revocation stays pending and attachment replacement remains refused; a successful denial write is not physical closure. Retry the same revocation after resolving the reported custody or observation failure.