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The Veil

A request arrives with Host, path, method, headers, and claims about its origin. The edge must reject, canonicalize, or map those values before they reach an application. Veil is the optional hostile-ingress Aspect outside the Vessel: it terminates TLS, handles protocols, admits routes, and sends canonical metadata to an independently guarded backend.

Veil is Designed; State of Work owns its delivery boundary. Until the local browser boundary changes, keep the Vessel and Altar on the same host—without an ad hoc reverse proxy, tunnel, or port-forward. The explicitly bounded single-owner forwarding candidate is an infrastructure experiment without a reverse proxy; it supplies no Veil implementation or browser qualification.

Admit the edge

ADR 40 selects Caddy as the default managed engine. An external edge remains possible, but no compatibility profile ships.

Begin with the particular route to expose. Its typed Rune names the host or route, backend, protocols, limits, application-authentication preconditions, and exposure tier: public, through Tether, or local. All other routes remain closed.

The design refuses ambiguous or overlapping ownership, unknown backends, unadmitted ports, and raw directives. A contribution cannot shadow Core, remove authentication, expose a database or model API, select an arbitrary upstream, or create a forward proxy. Before transactional inscription, the complete attributed configuration must pass Caddy validation in staging.

Caller-supplied forwarding, identity, and client-certificate claims are discarded. Canonical scheme, host, origin, and peer metadata may cross only an authenticated backend path the Vessel explicitly trusts. That is designed behavior, not today's loopback service.

Gateway

Veil may share the Core host or occupy a separate Gateway Host. Follow that guide to choose Home or Remote and its exact backend road; neither placement creates application authority. Core accepts only the declared Gateway identity and port. Policy outside the Gateway plus the receiving Core firewall must enforce the narrow zone; local Gateway rules are defense in depth. No broad LAN route, database, Context, Sigil, provider credential, or host-control path may cross it.

Reach route profiles

The Reach deployment matrix uses no Veil for home-only or standalone outbound VPS. The split reach.edge-home.public@1 profile binds a private home Veil only to its Tether address. Later profiles expose a closed set rather than a catch-all:

Surface Backend and admission
Reach edge relay private Tether-only event-admission, delivery-claim, delivery-settlement, and health routes to an isolated adapter; current edge Principal, epochs, bounds, replay fence, and Ward policy
public-safe Agent Card GET on the adapter-pinned well-known path; public metadata only; no implied trust or enrollment
callback-only client exact authenticated route to isolated Intercom ingress; existing outbound task/token correlation, replay fence, current authorization, and durable admission
full A2A server separate Intercom server ingress with Ward, inbox/outbox, Workers, quotas, and result path
unauthoritative health local or Tether-only until remote Ward IAM ships; no generic control route
Altar, database, model API, corpus writer, Reach core, Discord edge, egress gate, container or host control closed; no Veil contribution is admissible

Each admitted route pins methods, media, compressed and expanded size, JSON work, authentication, stream/time limits, exposure tier, backend, and adapter revision. Veil holds certificate and route material only. It never receives bot/provider/A2A application credentials or a path from hostile bytes to Discord delivery.

Keep authority behind the route

TLS authenticates an endpoint and protects bytes; routing selects a destination. The Ward and Vessel still authenticate the caller and authorize the exact object and effect. mTLS, arrival through Tether, or forwarded metadata may supply evidence, but cannot mint a Sigil, create an administrator, or make the fixed bootstrap magus:* identity valid remotely.

An A2A Agent Card, Scroll, or teaching bundle remains application material after crossing Veil. Veil may expose the admitted Intercom route locally, through Tether, or eventually publicly; it cannot validate Spell compatibility, approve teaching, admit a casting, or settle its Run.

Before a browser-facing listener opens, Host and Origin admission, DNS-rebinding defenses, secure sessions, local assets, request bounds, and protected diagnostics must pass hostile tests. State of Work records the present failures; Security owns the deeper boundary. Proxying and TLS leave those duties intact.

Veil may impose coarse traffic limits; egress, application validation, and complete DDoS defense remain elsewhere. The edge receives only a narrow path to registered HTTP backends, never database, model, Reactor, systemd, container, application-secret, or arbitrary-egress authority.

Fail without opening another path

A transition first detects listener and route collisions and validates the candidate before activation. Certificate state and account keys remain within declared durable and secret boundaries; the prior projection remains available for restoration. If renewal fails, keep the last valid configuration and degrade readiness before expiry. Failed ACME prerequisites leave the public Veil unavailable while the local Vessel continues. Reconciliation closes routes removed from the declaration.